ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
A number of recent studies have offered some analytical and empirical evidence to support the use of downside risk. In this context, downside risk is a risk measure that decomposes the variability of returns into the upside and downside parts. Importantly, it is a risk measure that only focuses on the downside part. The concept of 'downside risk' was first discussed in the early 1950s with the introduction of the concept of the safety first rule by Roy (1952) . The safety first rule argues that investors would prefer an investment with the smallest probability of falling below a disaster level. Harlow (1991) also highlighted that downside risk is an appropriate description of investment risk because investors are usually more concerned about losses relative to a threshold return level. Markowitz (1959) , commonly referred to as the 'father of Modern Portfolio Theory', also recognised the importance of this argument. As a result, he suggested the use of semi-variance for measuring the downside risk of an investment.
However, the concept of downside risk was only introduced into the real estate context by Sivitanides (1998) and Sing and Ong (2000) in the late 1990s. Sivitanides (1998) has examined the implications of downside risk to real estate portfolio construction where the results showed that standard deviation overstated the risk for investors. Sing and Ong (2000) found similar results in which downside risks (CLPM and SLPM) have lower deviations than variance. Importantly, Cheng (2001) and Coleman and Mansour (2005) have offered evidence of the downside allocation model appears to be a more rational model for real estate allocation. The rationales of using downside risk are that neither the normal return distribution assumption nor a quadratic utility function assumption is required (Nawrocki, 1999; Sing and Ong, 2000; Estrada, 2002) . The normal distribution assumption has been rejected by extensive studies such as Myer and Webb (1993; 1994) and Graff et al. (1997) . Bond and Patel (2003) also suggested using downside risk (semi-standard deviation) as the risk measure if returns are found to be skewed.
Extensive utility studies have also shown that the quadratic utility function assumption for traditional variance risk measures undermines the utility function's ability to describe the actual behaviour of investors (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971; Wippern, 1971) . The introduction of prospect theory and disappointment aversion (DA) theory in the utility literature by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Gul (1991) further improved utility theories in describing investor's behavioural. The theories posit that the impacts of losses are greater for investors or agents in comparison to gains. Importantly, these theories imply that downside risk is more consistent with investors' behaviour; particularly for investors who are averse to downside losses. More specifically, downside risk measure clearly indicates that investors view upside gains and downside losses in a different manner; however, investors generally are more concerned about the downside variability of their investments than the upside gains; upside variability is also argued as upside potential and not the risk for investors. These features have made downside risk appear to be a more efficient risk measure. Post and Vilet (2004) and Ang et al. (2006) in the finance literature and Cheng (2005) and Lee et al. (2008) in the real estate literature have also confirmed that downside beta is a more favourable risk measure than traditional beta in asset pricing. Indeed, the results exhibited that downside beta has strong exploratory power in explaining return variations; however, there is no similar evidence for upside beta and beta. This indicates that downside beta is the only risk that is priced by investors. Nevertheless, this has also raised the issue of "why is only downside beta priced?" A possible explanation is that investors only require compensation for downside risk, whilst they do not necessarily require a risk premium for upside potential. This statement is consistent with the findings from the survey of US business executives (Mao, 1970) and confirms that downside risk is an efficient risk measure. The reason of its recognition is that it is consistent with how investors individually perceive risk. Nevertheless, relatively few surveys or qualitative studies has been involved with property investors.
Importantly, the acceptance of theoretical assertions in industry is questionable. A survey of Australian property securities fund managers revealed that most of the fund managers rated that downside risk is a less important risk measure (Tan, 2004) . This finding is consistent with the argument of Brown and Matysiak (2000) , where the main disadvantage for using downside risk at present is that the analysis is not well understood. Sing and Ong (2000) have also argued that the unfamiliarity and complexity of downside risk computation could be the factors that hampering practitioners' acceptance towards downside risk. Evans (2004) has also revealed that standard deviation (or variance) is the most popular risk measure for investors which is consistent with the findings from Mao (1970) . The study depicted that variance is generally accepted and used as a risk measure in capital budgeting theory, even though investors are only concerned with downside losses. In portfolio management, Louargand (1992) and Worzala et al. (2000) also provided evidence that theoretical assertions from portfolio analysis are not necessarily followed by practitioners. Clearly, there is a conflict between theory and practice. Moreover, Evans (2004) exhibited that there is no relationship between risk tolerance level and expected returns from a survey, although this contradicts with the fundamental investment rule that 'higher risk equates to higher return'. Similarly, the findings of Worzala et al. (2000) also indicated that property investors do not believe that higher inherent risk for a particular asset can be justified by higher return.
Not all of the theoretical assertions will be rejected by practitioners. Worzala and Newell (1997) compared the results from two surveys with European investors (Worzala, 1994) and Asian investors (Newell and Worzala, 1995) and found that European and Asian investors recognised the importance of international real estate investment in enhancing portfolio diversification. This is consistent with the assertions from previous empirical studies, where the diversification benefits for international real estate have been highlighted in the real estate literature (Worzala and Sirmans, 2003) .
Overall, extensive theoretical evidence has revealed that downside risk is more consistent with investor behaviour. Conversely, there could be a gap between theoretical assertions and practice. In other words, the theoretical assertions from empirical and analytical studies for downside risk might not necessarily be accepted by practitioners. However, no study has been undertaken on the risk perceptions of property investors and their support of downside risk. Consequently, this study seeks to address this gap by examining the perceptions of property fund managers in Australia towards risk and their acceptance of downside risk.
The contributions of this study are twofold. Firstly, this study attempts to contribute a greater understanding of the investors' behaviour by conducting a survey about how individual investors actually perceive risks. This attempt is unique as many previous real estate studies have focused specifically on empirical approaches, while little has been placed on qualitative analysis. Most importantly, previous studies have confirmed that the empirical and analytical assertions are not necessarily automatically be accepted by practitioners. Secondly, the survey is also one of the first attempts to comprehensively examine the acceptance level of practitioners for the concept of downside risk, as well as to identify the factors that hinder their acceptance of downside risk.
SIGNIFICANCE OF AUSTRALIAN PROPERTY FUNDS INDUSTRY
Australia is one of the most securitised real estate markets in the world where the Australian property funds industry plays a significant role in the Australian property market. As at 3 January 2005, the Australian listed property market was the second largest securities market in the world with total market capitalisation of US$63.3 billion (PREI, 2005) . More than 60% of the commercial invested real estate in Australia and New Zealand are in a securitised form. On the other hand, the importance of securitised real estate market in the US and European countries were substantial lower than in Australia, where in comparison there is a contribution of less than 10% of their total commercial invested real estate market (RREEF, 2007) .
Listed Property Trust (LPT) is the most popular structure among Australian investors to be involved in property fund investments. In 2006, approximately AUD$143 billion total assets were managed by LPTs (PIR, 2006) . As at 31 March 2007, the total market capitalisation of LPTs was approximately AUD$137 billion, representing around 10% of the total Australian share market. In addition, LPTs appeared as one of the largest sub-sectors on ASX (ASX, 2007a; 2007b) . Most importantly, Table 1 reveals that LPTs had been one the strongest performing sectors over the past 10 years with the highest average return in comparison with other assets (e.g. shares, direct property and bonds).
In fact, LPTs are the only one type of indirect property vehicle in the Australian property funds industry. Almost half of the property funds (49%) consist of unlisted property trusts, wholesale funds, property syndicates and property securities funds. It should be noted that in 2006, all of these property funds owned over 5,600 institutionalgraded commercial properties in Australia and overseas with total assets of approximately AUD$275 billion with over 1.2 million investors (PIR, 2006) . In March 2007, almost 60% of the total assets of Australian institutional-graded commercial property assets were owned by Australian property funds (ABS, 2007) . In respect to the importance of Australian property funds industry in the Australian commercial property market, it is essential to understand the risk perceptions of Australian property fund managers and importantly how they perceive risk. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The aim of this study is to examine the risk perceptions of property fund managers towards downside risk, and to achieve this, a questionnaire was designed in order to obtain the property fund managers' views and opinions about risk. This is consistent with Rogelberg and Stanton (2007) where a survey is an effective and efficient tool for assessing the perceptions and attitudes of humans. In this study, a closed question style was designed and most questions were structured using a Likert scaling technique. A set of 5 scale point descriptors: 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'not sure', 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' was utilised in this study.
The information for each property fund was mainly identified via the Australian Property Funds Industry Survey 2006 report, which was published by Property Investment Research (PIR).
A total 233 property funds were identified from the report and the ASX website (www.asx.com.au). Note that mortgages property funds (60 funds) were excluded from this survey in line with the difference investment characteristics and nature of this type of business 1 . Moreover, there were 35 property funds without complete information due to several difficulties such as the funds were recently privatised, incomplete corresponding mailing and/or email addresses for the funds, no information on the contact person who should be contacted and so on. In turn, this resulted in a total of 138 samples with complete corresponding information being used in this analysis. In order to verify the reliability of the questionnaire, a pilot test with small number of funds was conducted. This was followed by minor changes before the full questionnaire was distributed.
The questionnaire is categorised into three parts. The first part of the questionnaire focuses on the profile of respondents and respondents' organisations, where the organisation's background and risk management practice are identified. The second part of the questionnaire emphasises the respondents' risk perceptions and their understanding on the concept of downside risk. The final part of the questionnaire focuses on employing downside risk in their organisations. The key motivations of employing downside risk, as well as the hurdles that hinder the use of downside risk among property fund managers are also investigated. The survey was conducted during May-June 2007 and the questionnaires were distributed to the property fund managers based throughout Australia via mail or email. To enrich the insights of this study, 6 respondents were also invited to participate with personal interviews 2 . The interviews were face-to-face structured interviews and each interview lasted approximately one hour.
Most questionnaires were sent to respondents who are at the level of "Managing Director" or "General Manager" or "Fund Manager". This approach was designed to benefit the study by ensuring a high level of reliability. In addition, the respondents have daily exposure to the fund's management, decision-making process, portfolio management, performance measurement as well as risk management. Accordingly, they were the most suitable person for responding the questionnaire. Their responses were then sorted and analysed using frequency analysis and cross-tabulation analysis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Profile of Australian property funds
This section provides an overview of the profile of respondents and their organisation. An invitation letter and questionnaire were sent simultaneously to 138 potential respondents. 6 respondents formally returned the questionnaire and declined to participate in this survey, resulting in an effective sample of 132 3 . 30 fund managers responded to the survey, equating to an overall response rate of approximately 23%.
A non-response analyse was conducted in order to examine the presence of nonresponse bias in this study and determine whether the findings based on the responses of these 30 respondents can be generalised to the population 4 . A follow-up approach of non-response analysis was employed in this study in which a reminder was sent to nonrespondents. As highlighted by Rogelberg and Stanton (2007) , the collected information and data from followed-up respondents can be used to compare with the responses from 2 The interviews were only conducted in Melbourne due to resources limitation. 3 It must also be noted that there is no evidence to show that these 132 fund managers had agreed to participate in this survey. 4 The non-response bias is argued as the main constrain of generalising a sample to the entire population. Besides, Werner et al. (2007) show that non-response analyses are reported in almost 1/3 of survey studies that are published in nine management journals (Tiers 1, 2 and 3).
early respondents on actual survey topic variables. This is a meaningful procedure in order to deal with the non-response bias.
The test was conducted and no considerable difference was found by comparing the responses from early respondents and follow up-respondents. Indeed, the results exhibit that only one survey topic variable/question (heard about downside risk before this survey) from both samples is statistically significant at the 5% level. No similar result is evident for other variables, suggesting that the absence of non-response bias in this survey is demonstrated and this 23% response rate can be used to generalise to the population 5 . Thereafter, the analyses are conducted based on the responses from 30 respondents. Firstly, the profile of 30 respondents is exhibited in Figure 1 . In general, most of the respondents are attached to an LPT. It is followed by unlisted property trusts, wholesale property funds, property securities funds and property syndicates. This is quite consistent with the organisational breakdown of the Australian property funds industry, which is largely dominated by LPTs.
Figure 2: Benchmark of the organisation
Almost 83% of respondents have a benchmark for their funds where a range of benchmarks were employed by respondents. Figure 2 compares the benchmarks that are employed by Australian property funds. The S&P/ASX 200 Property Trust Index appears as the most often used benchmark for Australian property funds. In addition, the S&P/ASX 300 Property Index, S&P/ASX 200 Property Accumulation Index, MERCER property fund index and Consumer Price Index (CPI) plus a specific target rate are also commonly used indices. Finally, the S&P/ASX 200 and S&P/ASX 300 Property Accumulation Index are the least common indices, although not all of these funds are required to outperform the benchmark; with only 63% of them are required to outperform the benchmark. On the other hand, 37% of respondents do not have any obligation to outperform the benchmark. In other words, only about 60% of property fund managers could be remunerated with a performance fee.
Surprisingly, almost half of the respondents do not have any specific risk measure. Nevertheless, this does not indicate that risk management is irrelevant for these funds. Many respondents pointed out that although no explicit risk measure is employed, the funds have also attempted to minimise their investment risk via some property/ project specific measures such as Monte Carlo simulation, scenario analysis and stress analysis. It is also believed that these measures could provide more reliable risk measurement. The specific risk measures that are employed by the property funds are presented in Figure 3 . Figure 3 presents the risk measures that are employed by most property funds. It is clear that the standard deviation (SD) appears as the most common risk measure; it is followed by beta, tracking error and risk-adjusted ratio. These results are consistent with the results from previous surveys of US private investors and US business executives (Mao, 1970; Evans, 2004 
Risk perceptions
The previous section confirmed that variance and variance-related risk measures are the commonly used risk measures, while downside risk usage is relatively uncommon. Does this indicate that variance and variance-related risk measures are more consistent with property investors' risk perceptions? In this section, the perceptions of Australian property fund managers towards risk are surveyed and investigated.
Property fund managers were asked a series of questions in order to examine their perceptions towards risk. Firstly, they were given a hypothetical situation in which they were asked to assume that the benchmark return for their funds is 8%. Then, they were asked to respond whether they would be concerned if the performance of their fund fell below the target rate. Finally, they were asked whether they would worry if the performance of their funds rose above the target rate. Tables 2 and 3 present the results. In Table 2 , it can be observed that property fund managers tend to agree that downside losses are risks for their investments. The majority (80%) of the respondents agreed that they would be concerned if their fund failed to achieve the target rate. This indicates that most fund managers agree that the downside part is risky. This result also confirms the previous empirical findings by Cheng (2005) , Ang et al. (2006) and Lee et al. (2008) in which downside beta is priced by investors. The results also provide a possible explanation to why downside beta is priced, which is documented by extensive empirical studies. However, almost 17% of respondents would not worry if their fund performance fell below the target rate. In other words, upside variability is irrelevant for property fund managers in estimating risk. Apparently, this indicates that investors do not necessarily require a risk premium for upside variability. This strong negative response on upside variability also offers some explanation to why no evidence is evident by empirical studies to show that upside beta is priced 6 . In other words, these fund managers expect the performance of their funds to be consistent with their expectations. Therefore, extreme volatility is undesirable regardless of whether it is downside volatility or upside volatility. This signifies that even though downside risk is the only risk priced by the majority of property fund managers, there is no evidence to show downside risk is a perfect risk measure for all investors.
Although these questions were designed to examine the perceptions of fund managers towards under-performance and outperformance of their funds, the findings are invariant by rephrasing the questions to the uncertainty downside (upside) of investment losses (gain
Interestingly, Table 2 highlights that nearly 17% of all investors in the survey do not consider that the uncertainty of not achieving the target rate measures risk is a form of risk. Using the 'Benchmark' variable could perhaps be a valid explanation for this circumstance in which those respondents who do not have a benchmark for their organisation might not able to appreciate the underlying concept for the question. This can be demonstrated by the cross-tabulation in Table 4 . Respondents without a benchmark tend to be less concerned with downside variability in which 60% of them selected 'no'. More importantly, the chi-squared statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level. The contingency coefficient and Cramer's V both are also statistically significant at 5% which suggest that those respondents with and those respondents without a benchmark generally will give different answers. Thus, being unable to appreciate the underlying concept for the question is a reasonable explanation for this circumstance. Table 5 shows that a benchmark does not have a far-reaching impact on respondents' opinions for upside potential. The insignificant chi-squared statistic, contingency coefficient and Cramer's V statistic show that the baseline results in Table  3 are independent from the benchmark. In other words, there is no relationship between respondents' perceptions towards upside variability and benchmark.
Overall, the results indicate that a premium is required by investors for downside risk, while there is little evidence to support the view that investors need compensation for upside potential. This can also be used to explain why the empirical evidence clearly shows that downside beta is statistically significant. On the other hand, similar evidence does not exist for upside beta. This confirms that downside risk is an efficient risk measure because it is more consistent with investors' behaviour, where this finding has been supported both empirically and qualitatively in that investors are more concerned about downside losses than the upside gains.
Understanding of downside risk
The previous section has demonstrated that downside risk is more consistent with how investors individually perceive risk. The results show that investors are more concerned about underperforming rather than outperforming the benchmark. In this section the awareness of downside risk among property fund managers is also examined. One of the advantages of downside risk is that it is able to accommodate different risk tolerance levels of investors since the assumption that all investors have similar risk aversion levels is debatable. Table 6 reveals that almost all respondents disagree with this argument. Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971) in which quadratic utility function assumptions cannot precisely explain actual investor behavioural. This also provides further support for the use of downside risk, where it has been demonstrated by Nawrocki (1999) and Sing and Ong (2000) that different risk tolerance levels of investors can be accommodated by using downside risk. Table 7 shows the importance of investors' risk aversion in estimating risk, with more than 90% of respondents agreeing that investors' risk aversion should be considered in estimating risk. However, 6.7% of respondents disagree with this statement with one explanation being that they do not believe that any risk measure can successfully incorporate this element. This scenario is clearly demonstrated in table 8. . This indicates that in general most property investors do not agree that these risk measures (i.e. downside risk and variance) can accommodate investors' risk aversion. This implies that more study or endeavour is required to demonstrate the theoretical superiorities of downside risk which in turn will increase the awareness of property investors.
There is another motivation for using downside risk, as it does not require a normality assumption for return distributions. Hence, respondents were asked for their opinions on return distributions; in particular, are return distributions normally distributed? Table 9 exhibits the perceptions of property investors towards return distributions. In response to this question, only approximately 30% of respondents either disagree (16.7%) or strongly disagree (13.3%) that return distributions are normally distributed. In contrast, almost 47% of respondents agree and 6.7% respondents strongly agree with this statement. The strong agreement for this statement is inconsistent with the empirical evidence that has been documented by other researchers (Myer and Webb, 1993; 1994; Graff et al., 1997) . The response from one of the interviewees could be a possible explanation for the divergence.
"No. It can't be (normal). In fact, it is very very hard to be normal. In my experience, it is skewed... So, I am saying from practical term; I don't think it is very normal. But, I
will still use normal assumption and normal distribution. Otherwise, I am not going to finish…" (Personal Interview, June 2007) This confirms that many fund managers do not agree that real estate return distributions are normally distributed. However, many fund managers commonly use traditional investment theories such as mean-variance analysis and CAPM which restrict analysis to the first two-moment assumption. Therefore, they have to use the normal assumption and assume that real estate return distributions are normally distributed when doing their analyses, although they do not totally agree with this assumption.
There is another concern about the understanding of downside risk among respondents with and without a specified risk measure where the responses from these two groups could be different. Kruskal-Wallis test was performed in order to examine the differences among the responses from these groups of respondents. The results are displayed in Table 10 . Table 10 exhibits the differences in term of the responses from these groups of respondents to the understanding of downside risk. No substantial difference is observed by comparing the responses from these groups. The only exception is 'the agreement of all investors have similar risk aversion level' where the chi-squared statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level. The respondents with a specified risk measure tend to "strongly disagree" with the statement of all investors have similar risk aversion levels, whereas the respondents without a specified risk measure would prone to "disagree" with this statement rather than "strongly disagree". In short, no evidence is presented to support that there is a difference between these two groups of respondents on the understanding of downside risk.
In summary, it appears that most property investors are not conversant with the theoretical superiorities of downside risk. Even though the limitations of variance are acknowledged by these property investors, they do not believe that downside risk measure can resolve these limitations. In other words, the theoretical assertions for downside risk are not accepted by practitioners. This supports the belief that more empirical tests on downside risk should be conducted and disseminated in order to increase the awareness of property fund managers towards downside risk.
Downside risk employment
The previous section has clearly shown the understanding and awareness of downside risk among property fund managers is relatively low. In this section, the use of downside risk by Australian property funds is examined. In particular, respondents were asked for the reasons of employing and/or not employing downside risk. Figure 4 highlights the proportion of respondents who employ downside risk. According to the survey, 73% of respondents do not use downside risk; conversely 27% of respondents do utilise downside risk. This is inconsistent with the findings from Figure  3 where only 4% of respondents employ downside risk. The explanations from some interviewees are that even though no formal downside risk measure is employed in estimating the downside risk of their investments, several informal ways to minimise downside risk are employed by Australian property fund managers. For example, sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis are employed in order to forecast the worst scenario for their investments. Some funds utilise the firm-specific characteristics such as gearing, management structure, quality of asset, size and liquidity variables in order to minimise the downside risk of their investments. Lee et al. (2007) previously demonstrated that these variables have some relationships with downside beta. Interestingly, this also implies that a common definition of downside risk should be defined in the literature. The 27% of respondents who employed downside risk were asked to answer why they use downside risk. The results are depicted in Figure 5 where it shows that "suitable with the risk management plan" as the key motivation for many property fund managers to employ downside risk. However, its recognition as "a superior risk measure" and "it is easy and convenience of use" are reasons put forward by some property funds. Some property funds use it for cross-checking purposes. Other reasons are "it is one type of employed risk measures for their funds" and "appropriateness to describe risk in relation to fund's investment objective". This confirms that property fund managers view that minimising downside losses of their investments is essential, where taking steps to minimise downside risk is consistent with the risk management of their funds. Table 11 highlights the reasons for not using downside risk among property investors who do not use downside risk (73%). The most common reason is "unfamiliarity of downside risk" in which many property fund managers prefer to employ popular risk measures such as variance rather than unpopular risk measures. A large proportion of investors cited other significant factors for not employing downside risk including "not suitable with their risk management plan" and "lack of awareness with its theoretical superiorities". Other reasons that were pointed out by respondents are "it is not required by clients" and "no reason to use it". In other words, they cannot see any economic benefits for using it.
Interestingly, no respondent agreed that the intractability and complexity of the downside risk measure are causes for impeding them from employing downside risk. This indicates that even though fund managers are more comfortable with traditional risk measures, it does not mean that they are reluctant to accept new risk measures such as downside risk due to the complexity of the measures. Nevertheless, lack of familiarity could be the main reason for resistance among property fund managers to downside risk. This group of respondents was also asked to response whether they would consider the use of downside risk measure in the future. As depicted in Figure 6 , generally, many (45%) of respondents are unsure whether or not they will employ downside risk in the future. Among them, 23% of respondents clearly indicated that they do not have any intention of utilising it in the future. In contrast, the future employment of downside risk is only applicable to approximately one third of respondents. It must be noted that its future employment is subject to the significance of its economic meaning. It is most succinctly voiced by one interviewee: In other words, the lukewarm attention of investors to the downside risk of their investments has undermined its economic value. It should be noted that the recent US sub-prime mortgage crisis and the collapse of several property funds in Australia could create awareness by investors to the importance of measuring the downside risk of their investments.
PROPERTY INVESTMENT IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The attractiveness of downside risk has been demonstrated by extensive empirical and analytical studies. Importantly, these studies confirm that downside risk is the only applicable risk for investors. However, there is a growing concern that there could be a gap between practice and theoretical assertions. This paper attempts to fill in the gap by examining the perceptions of property fund managers towards downside risk.
There are several important findings from this study. First, variance-framework risk measures are the popular risk measures among property fund managers. Second, downside losses emerge as the only risk for most property investors where this can be used to explain why downside beta is priced. Generally, property fund managers require a risk premium for downside losses, although in direct contrast there is no evidence to show they require compensation for upside potential. This provides further support for the empirical evidence in prior studies where investors are more concerned with the downside volatility rather than upside.
Third, the results show that there is a disparity between theory and practice. Although fund managers agree that downside losses are risks for their investment, they are more concerned with the economic meanings of employing downside risk. In other words, the theoretical assertions about downside risk from empirical and analytical analyses are not accepted by property investors. Additionally, the understanding or awareness of downside risk among Australian property fund managers is still relatively low.
The implications from the paper are that property analysts should consider the use of downside risk since it has been demonstrated that it is a favourable risk measure which is consistent with how investors individually perceive risk. Moreover, sustained efforts from researchers and educators in promoting and demonstrating the advantages of downside risk are also crucial. Overall, this study has improved the critical understanding of the perceptions of property investors towards risk. Increased understanding on how property investors perceive risk could facilitate investors in assessing the risks of their investments accurately. Note: * significance at the 5% level, ** significance at the 1% level.
